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Institutional Trustworthiness and National Security Governance: Evidence from 
six European countries 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between the institutional trustworthiness of 
security agencies in the context of data intensive security practices. It focuses on the 
public’s acceptance of the way digital surveillance technologies feed into large scale 
security data analytics. Using the case of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), survey data 
gathered in six European countries (n=1,202) demonstrates that security agencies’ 
institutional trustworthiness directly and indirectly influences public acceptance of DPI. 
Against a backdrop of declining public trust in government and a climate of intense 
international terrorist threat, governments around the world are appealing to citizens to 
trade privacy for enhanced security. This paper supports calls for security agencies and 
their respective governments to engage with the democratic process in order to enrich 




Institutional Trustworthiness and National Security Governance: Evidence from 
six European countries 
1. Introduction 
Surveillance oriented security technologies, or ‘SOSTs’ (Pavone & Degli Esposti, 
2012), are deployed by governments around the world to counter crime and terrorism. 
SOSTs rely on the use of electronic devices, information infrastructures and data 
processing capacity to collect and analyze electronic data concerning inter alia the 
communications, financial transactions and travel movements of citizens in order to 
determine likely threats (Ball, Canhoto et al., 2015). This paper shows that the 
institutional trustworthiness of security agencies which deploy SOSTs mediates their 
public acceptance. Examples of SOSTs include smart CCTV, biometric identification 
systems, location tracking systems, passenger name record sharing and digital 
communications surveillance technologies. 
SOSTs help security agencies safeguard citizens’ and national security. Security is part 
of the common good: without a secure society it would be difficult to run education, 
health and economic systems, and democratic rights could not be easily exercised 
(Loader & Walker, 2007). Yet, questions have emerged about these surveillance 
intensive methods and their potential to undermine the very fabric of the societies that 
security agencies are there to protect. Questions concern, for example, the levels of 
privacy intrusion which are associated with SOSTs and the accountability of the 
security agencies using them.  
The paper examines perceptions of one particular SOST, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). 
DPI is used by security agencies and internet service providers (ISPs) around the world 
to read and track the content of internet communications and to filter all web 
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communications to identify potential targets. It represents a form of “unprecedented and 
invasive ISP surveillance” (Ohm, 2009, p. 1417) that works by inserting a middle-man, 
or a gatekeeper, between internet users and those with whom they communicate 
(Cooper, 2011). DPI is clearly problematic for electronic communications privacy as it 
enables the content of messages which have not been encrypted to be read by third 
parties such as security agencies and businesses. Even if the message is encrypted, DPI 
can still glean information from the messages metadatai pertaining to the sender, the 
receiver and their activities. 
The theoretical approach that is used combines perspectives from risk analysis, public 
administration and organizational psychology to examine the institutional 
trustworthiness of security agencies in the context of DPI. It draws on survey data 
gathered at nine citizen consultation events held in six European countries in 2014 
(n=1,202). The day-long events, called ‘Citizen Summits’, required citizens to evaluate 
DPI in their own national contexts. The deliberative research method chosen ensured 
that study participants had time to familiarize themselves with a complex technology 
such as DPI and reflect on its risks and benefits. Trustworthiness was measured through 
a composite score that accounted for its three internal dimensions: competence, 
benevolence and integrity (Mayer, Davis et al., 1995). 
This paper provides evidence as to the strong direct effect of perceived institutional 
trustworthiness on the public acceptance of DPI. Institutional trustworthiness also 
influences perceptions of DPI’s effectiveness, which then contributes to an increase in 
its public acceptance. The results also confirm those of previous studies, which address 
the mediating role of technology risks and benefits on their public acceptance 
(Bronfman & Vázquez, 2011). When DPI is perceived to be operated by trustworthy 
security agencies, the public are more inclined to believe that it is effective and hence 
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more willing to accept it as a legitimate security solution. They are also more inclined to 
consider that the technology is less intrusive and again be more willing to accept it. 
Second, however, when DPI is believed to be operated by untrustworthy security 
agencies, the more that the public perceive it to be intrusive, the more critical they 
become and the less likely they are to believe in its effectiveness and support its use. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the more citizens consider security agencies to be 
competent, honest and to be acting in the public interest, the more likely they are to 
support the use of DPI.  
These results do not imply, however, that security agencies need to pursue a charm 
offensive in order to carry out intrusive mass surveillance. Instead, the paper contributes 
to the ongoing debate within public administration scholarship about the merits of 
enhanced participation between citizens and public policing and security agencies as 
part of the common good (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Robinson, Liu et al., 2013; Williams, 
2015). The paper acknowledges skepticism about the adoption of transparent and 
accountable measures by security agencies, with claims that disclosing confidential 
information may jeopardize national security (Colaresi, 2014). In this sense, it has been 
argued that security delimits what democratic mechanisms may achieve, by placing 
certain aspects of security practice beyond democratic scrutiny (Huysmans, 2014).  
The paper counters these arguments by drawing on the work of Loader and Walker 
(2007) who propose an agenda for developing security as a ‘thick’ public good. They 
call for the state to engage in four processes. First, the open consideration of resource 
distribution between security agencies; second, clarity as to the security stakeholders 
and their interests so that they be effectively regulated, for example, through the 
licensing of security providers; third, the placing of fundamental rights at the heart of 
security policies; and finally, the public deliberation and contestation of security 
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priorities. These ideas inform a research agenda explored in the final sections of the 
paper which draws on the deliberative turn recently witnessed in public administration 
research and practice. Specifically, it proposes that research may focus on the 
mechanisms which foster trustworthiness between the public and those institutions 
which are charged with protecting national security and hold the latter to account.  
2. The security context 
2.1 Internet surveillance using deep packet inspection 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is used by security agencies and internet service providers 
around the world to read and track the content of internet communications and to filter 
all web communications to identify potential targets. DPI takes place in routers, 
computers which direct traffic around the internet. When a message is sent, it is broken 
down into smaller chunks called ‘packets’. Each packet has several layers, which 
contains different information about the message: a header, referred to as ‘metadata’ in 
legislation and the media, which is the address of the packet; and a payload, its contents. 
Internet service providers need to inspect some of the message’s packets for it to be 
delivered. In most cases, it is only necessary to review metadata to enable delivery. DPI, 
however, involves looking beyond the headers to inspect all packets of a message 
including the payloads. In delivering oral evidence to the U.K. government’s 
Intelligence and Security Committee in 2013, BAE Systems Detica, which supplies DPI 
to the British Government, described it as a flexible technology which “…gives you the 
ability to look at what is going on the network and make decisions about what you want 
to do with what’s travelling on the network” (ISC, 2013, p. 20). 
DPI is acknowledged as a growing area in the development of both commercial and 
security applications (Research&Markets, 2017). It was originally developed to detect 
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malware, but is now also used to manage digital rights, target advertising and identify 
malicious, dangerous or criminal activity online, such as the distribution of child 
pornography, hate speech or terrorism (Wehner, 2013). National security agencies 
around the world can perform DPI by either routing commercial information flows 
through their own infrastructures (Clement, 2013), or by tapping those of information 
services providers (Campbell, 2016). British security agencies use DPI to as a means to 
access communications data from uncooperative overseas Communications Service 
Providers (ISC, 2013). It was implicated in the Snowden revelations and features in the 
NSA and GCHQ’s shared Upstream and Tempora programs (Porcedda, 2013). The 
NSA routinely filters huge swathes of web communications using DPI at suspected 
filtering centers all over North America, alongside AT&T/Fairview surveillance centers 
in Europe and the U.S.ii. As well as mass surveillance, DPI has been linked to online 
censorship by politically repressive regimes, with allegations it was used by the Libyan 
and Egyptian government to crush dissent in the Arab Spring (Fuchs, 2013). In 2016, 
Procera Networks witnessed an internal crisis over its decision to sell DPI technology in 
Turkey, particularly over whether to fulfil their client’s request to be able extract 
personal passwords from unencrypted data streams (Lauterbach, 2017). 
European laws severely restrict the use of DPI for commercial purposes. British 
Telecom, Virgin Media and Talk Talk fell foul of these laws in 2008 when their service 
‘Phorm’ relied on DPI. Phorm allowed ISPs to track their customers' internet use to 
personalize advertising on the web pages they subsequently visit for advertising 
purposes (Bernal, 2011). The controversy emerged in 2008 when it was revealed that 
BT had secretly run trials on tens of thousands of customers without their consent 
(Williams, 2008). As a result, the European Commission referred the U.K. to the 
European Court of Justice for breaching E.U. data protection rules (EDRi, 2010). By 
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contrast in the U.S., where it is unregulated, the commercial uses of DPI are booming 
(Wehner, 2013).iii  
The use of DPI by security agencies therefore potentially benefits society by identifying 
the perpetrators of serious offences and, by consequence, reducing victimization. 
However, there are direct privacy harms associated with its use as well as harms to the 
rights which are qualified by privacy, such as freedom of speech. The prospect of 
having one’s communications read by a government agency produces a chilling effect 
(Askin, 1972). Such concerns are emphasized when its use by repressive regimes to 
quell dissent and censor online content are considered. Furthermore, because the 
identities of those agencies who use DPI, their purposes and its location are opaque in 
all instances, it is difficult to hold accountable. For citizens, therefore, its appropriate 
use is a matter of how trustworthy they perceive security agencies to be. 
2.2 Trustworthiness and security governance  
Studies in the field of public administration have revealed that the institutional 
trustworthiness of government bodies depends on public perceptions of their 
performance and the quality of the democracy they engender (Cleary & Stokes, 2006). 
Evidence from South Korea suggests that public trust in national government can be 
enhanced by initiatives addressing performance, transparency, citizen participation and 
the exercise of democratic rights (Kim & Lee, 2012). In Europe and the US, local 
initiatives designed to repair trust and stimulate political participation such as e-
government (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006), ethics regulation (Cowell, Downe et al., 
2014) and participatory decision making (Cooper, Knotts et al., 2008), have met with 
some success; but trust in national government remains low. Low trust in government is 
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interpreted as a barometer of dissatisfaction with government programs, party 
polarizations and economic change, among other things (Kim, 2010). 
There is evidence from public opinion surveys that public trust in government is 
particularly sensitive to government actions around national security matters. For 
example, in 2001, trust in the United States federal government briefly increased with 
its muscular response to 9/11 but then decreased the following year (Tolbert & 
Mossberger, 2006). The picture, however, varies according to the type of security 
agency in question. Across Europe citizens appear to trust the police significantly more 
than they do the legal or the political system and, with the exception of Greece, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark and the Netherlands, citizens trust the 
police more than they do each other (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2017). At the E.U. level, 
citizens who trust the European Union tend to be more in favor of E.U. wide security 
measures than those who do not (EC, 2017). Overall, however, in the last ten years there 
has been a systematic decline of public trust in government in both Europe and the U.S. 
(Levi & Stoker, 2000; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).  
The picture is made more complex by the fact that security governance extends beyond 
the boundaries of the public sector. National security provision is now distributed across 
a wide range of private security providers, as well as government agencies. Private 
security providers include those which supply physical security services, technical 
advice and training in various military contexts as well as the large defense contractors 
who install software and systems (for example, Raytheon, BAE Systems, Qinetiq, and 
Lockheed Martin). The growth of the private security industry is attributed, in no small 
degree, to state fiscal crises, the under-resourcing of police forces, the rise of a 
neoliberal mentality which seeks to make non-state actors responsible for security, 
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coupled with public worries about crime and terror fueled by the media (Goold, Loader 
et al., 2010).  
Indeed, there is an enduring tension between the public good of maintaining security 
and private sector interests of profit-making. Adam White (2012) outlines a dialectical 
relationship between these competing interests, arguing that firms need to internalize 
more public-spirited security values. There are clear dangers associated with the use of 
private security contractors where this has not occurred as they are not publicly 
accountable for their actions (Baker & Pattison, 2012). As the governance systems 
surrounding national security have already been criticized as unaccountable, ineffective 
and opaque (Anderson, 2015), this paper argues that any future research agenda will 
need to take account of the complex inter-organizational relationships which comprise 
contemporary security practices. Therefore, whilst the primary focus of the empirical 
work featured concerns security agencies, the paper recognizes that the debate does not 
end there. 
3. Theoretical development and hypotheses 
This section outlines the variables which feature in the research design. Public 
acceptance of DPI is the dependent variable. Independent variables are the institutional 
trustworthiness of the security agencies which use DPI, and the perceived effectiveness 
and perceived intrusiveness of DPI. 
3.1 Public acceptance of DPI 
Acceptance, the dependent variable, combines measures of support for, and resistance 
to, the use of DPI. Acceptance is the preferred construct in both policy documents and 
the academic literature (Siegrist, 2008; EC, 2012). Although widely used, it is never 
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defined. Many authors use the wording “To what extent do you find acceptable the 
following technology for..?” in their questions, leaving the concept unexplained 
(Bronfman & Vázquez, 2011). A technology gains public acceptance when it is received 
favorably or with approval. Consequently, the technology can be used over time without 
enduring harm and in the knowledge that it conforms to approved standards. Users do 
not engage in any form of collective, or individual, action which may create disruption 
to the deployment and implementation of the technology by complaining, protesting, 
refusing to use the solution or opposing it. Opposition is, therefore, the corollary of 
acceptance.  
A key assumption is that the public will be prepared to use a technology that gains 
public acceptance, or have it used on their behalf. Consequently, technology adoption 
becomes a proxy for acceptance. In the case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
for example, individuals who considered their development and use acceptable were 
more willing to buy GMO foods than those who did not (Siegrist, 2008). However, as 
SOSTs are used by security agencies, it is almost impossible to find an action taken by 
citizens that equates to technological adoption as a proxy for acceptance. Citizens 
subject to SOSTs rarely have a say on their design and adoption, producing an 
asymmetry of power between citizens and public authorities. Instead, the extent to 
which the public support the use of SOSTs by security agencies is the measure adopted 
in this paper.  
To develop the concept, measures are added concerning the public resistance and public 
avoidance of SOSTS. Insights are drawn from marketing (Lee, Motion et al., 2009), and 
innovation studies that investigate resistance to, and the avoidance of, new products, 
brands or innovations (Kleijnen, Lee et al., 2009)iv. As such, three dimensions of public 
acceptance of SOSTs are proposed: support, avoidance and resistance. From this 
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perspective, public acceptance of SOSTs becomes a multi-item attitudinal measure 
designed to capture participants’ support for SOSTs, as well as their concerns and 
opposition. The resulting indicator is expected to be inversely related to the perceived 
privacy risk in interacting with SOSTs and directly related to the perceived security 
benefits.  
Public acceptance is distinct from public acceptability. Public acceptability represents a 
future-oriented concept which help to judge the appropriateness, or legitimacy, of a 
technology. A technology is acceptable when it has the potential of being endured, 
because it is tolerable, adequate and conforms to approved societal or ethical standards 
(Degli Esposti, Pavone et al., 2017). By contrast, public acceptance is a past-oriented 
concept used to assess the extent to which an already adopted technology has triggered 
public opposition or acceptance. Although acceptance and acceptability are interrelated, 
public acceptance does not necessarily imply acceptability from a legal or human rights 
perspective. SOSTs may enjoy high public acceptance but still run contrary to human 
rights, national constitutional principles, or regulation. Sometimes public acceptance 
can be the result of repression, lack of freedom of expression or simple inertia or lack of 
information. Nonetheless, technologies which are considered acceptable by the public 
may well also be technologies accepted by the public, depending on when the question 
is asked. 
3.2 Institutional trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is defined as a set of beliefs about a third party that facilitates ‘a 
willingness to depend on [that] party in a situation of risk’ (Akter, D'Ambra et al., 2011, 
p. 100). As SOSTs are deployed to counter threats, they reflect the risks inherent in their 
context of deployment. SOSTs also create civil liberties risks. If better national security 
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does not result from the sharing of data—as was the case in Belgium where information 
sharing did not prevent ISIS attacks—the public legitimacy and trustworthiness of the 
relevant security agencies suffers (Brunsden, Chassany et al., 2016). Some observers 
have suggested that traditional intelligence services, such as agent infiltration, would 
have been more effective in monitoring and tracking down terrorists (Vitali, 2015). 
Institutional trustworthiness, then, appears that it may be central to the public 
acceptability of SOSTs.  
Trustworthiness can be distinguished from trust in two ways. First, trustworthiness 
relates to a willingness to act, whereas trust relates to an action which has taken place. 
As such, trustworthiness reflects beliefs about whether a third party can be relied upon 
and influences willingness to rely on that party in the future (Colquitt, Scott et al., 
2007). Trustworthiness therefore relates to citizen beliefs about the properties of the 
institution and how they serve their interests. Second, while trust is only experienced at 
an interpersonal level, trustworthiness can be experienced between individuals and other 
social entities, such as institutions. Accordingly, institutional trustworthiness is 
primarily conceptualized as an individual’s willingness to trust in what the institution 
does and stands for, rather than in the people who work within it (Cook & Gronke, 
2005).  
Three literatures approach trustworthiness with the aim of stabilizing definitions and 
measurements of the concept: risk analysis, public administration and organizational 
psychology. Risk analysis advances a ‘deficit model’ of trustworthiness, arguing that its 
basis is an institution’s superior knowledge of the particular risk with which they are 
dealing (White & Eiser, 2005). According to the deficit model, citizens lack knowledge 
and must rely on institutions to address risks for them (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). 
Examples include studies of nuclear waste disposal sites (Freudenburg, 1993), food risk 
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(Eiser, Miles et al., 2002), and other environmental risks (Flynn, Slovic et al., 1994). 
Workplace studies of trustworthiness also establish that as a consequence of increased 
institutional trustworthiness, individuals’ willingness to accept risk is increased (Mayer, 
Davis et al., 1995).  
Trustworthiness is conventionally measured using an overall trustworthiness measure 
and several sub-scales. Progress towards a multi-dimensional measure beyond that used 
in the deficit model has been made in the fields of public administration and 
organizational psychology, with significant cross fertilization between the two. 
Research in public administration tends to investigate the trustworthiness of local and 
national governments (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; Cooper, 
Knotts et al., 2008; Kim & Lee, 2012), while in organizational psychology the focus is 
on top management (Schoorman, Mayer et al., 2007). These literatures have established 
that trustworthiness has at least three principal components.  
• Competence—whether the institution is perceived to be able to deliver its 
objectives 
• Benevolence—whether the institution is perceived to be concerned about the 
welfare and integrity of the community, as opposed to acting out of self-interest 
• Integrity—whether the institution is perceived to act in an ethical way and not to 
abuse its power. 
These components have been widely applied, including in relation to the acceptability 
of mobile-health information systems (Akter, D'Ambra et al., 2011) and e-government 
(Avgerou, Ganzaroli et al., 2009; Smith, 2011). Reflecting different dimensions of the 
institution, there is evidence that each component has a separate relationship with 
overall trustworthiness (Colquitt, Scott et al., 2007). However, the pattern of these 
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relationships has yet to be clearly established. We now move on to discuss the 
remaining variables in the research design.  
3.3 DPI perceived intrusiveness and effectiveness  
All SOSTs bring both security benefits and privacy risks. With the exception of a study 
by Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris (2008), which investigates security experts’ assessments 
of twelve homeland security solutionsv, the internal dimensions of security benefits and 
privacy risks remain unexplored. According to this study, solutions were considered 
more acceptable when they were perceived to improve national security, when 
participants benefitted from them personally, and when they were seen as a valid 
response to the security problem they were deployed to solve. These solutions were also 
considered to pose the lowest threat to civil liberties.  
Two factors underpinned participants’ responses: the perceived intrusiveness (privacy 
risks) and the perceived effectiveness (security benefit) of the security solutions. 
Perceived effectiveness, which was an overall perception of how worthwhile a 
particular security measure might be, was positively correlated with acceptance. 
Effectiveness encompassed both perceptions of technical performance (e.g., national 
security benefit, accuracy) and more general acceptability-oriented attributes (i.e., 
equitability, transparency, control). Intrusiveness, which concerned the risks of civil 
liberties infringement, general intrusiveness, embarrassment, financial loss, 
unauthorized disclosure, and false identification, was negatively correlated with 
acceptance. In this case, acceptance apparently involved a balance of benefits (SOST 




4. Empirical model and corresponding hypotheses 
The theoretical model sets out the hypothesized relationships between the perceived 
trustworthiness of security agencies and public acceptance of SOSTs, controlling for the 
effect of perceived intrusiveness and effectiveness on acceptance. The relationship 
between security agencies trustworthiness and SOST intrusiveness and effectiveness is 
also investigated. The model suggests that the more that citizens perceive DPI to be 
effective, the more likely they are to accept it (H2a); while the more that citizens 
perceive DPI to be intrusive, the less likely they are to accept it (H3a); and the less 
likely they are to find it effective (H3b). Moreover, the more that citizens perceive 
security agencies to be trustworthy, the more likely they are to accept DPI (H1a); to rate 
DPI as effective (H1b); and the less likely they are to rate DPI as intrusive (H1c). 
Finally, public effectiveness (M1 and M3) is expected to mediate the effect of 
trustworthiness and intrusiveness on acceptance; and public intrusiveness (M2) is 
expected to mediate the effect of trustworthiness on acceptance. The hypotheses are 
summarized in figure three. 
The following hypotheses relating to citizens’ risk assessments and the use of DPI are 
formulated: 
H1a The more that citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the more 
likely they are to find DPI acceptable. 
The relationship between institutional trustworthiness and citizens’ subjective 
assessments of the risks and benefits of SOST’s is also assessed (Siegrist, 2000):  
H1b The more that citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the more 
likely they are to rate DPI as effective. 
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H1c The more that citizens perceive security agencies to be trustworthy, the less 
likely they are to rate DPI as intrusive. 
The relationships between effectiveness, intrusiveness and acceptability are tested as 
follows:  
H2a The more that citizens perceive DPI to be effective, the more likely they are to 
find it acceptable. 
H3a The more that citizens perceive DPI to be intrusive, the less likely they are to 
find it acceptable. 
The following mediating effects of citizens’ perceptions of intrusiveness and 
effectiveness on trustworthiness, described in figure one, are tested:  
M1: DPI perceived effectiveness will mediate the effect of security agencies’ 
trustworthiness on public acceptance of DPI. 
M2:  DPI perceived intrusiveness will mediate the effect of security agencies’ 
trustworthiness on public acceptance of DPI. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Reflecting the balance of benefits and risks, the following relationship and mediating 
effect, described in figure two, are tested: 
H3b The more that citizens perceive DPI to be intrusive, the less likely they are to 
find it effective. 
M3: DPI perceived effectiveness will mediate the effect of DPI perceived 
intrusiveness on public acceptance of SOST. 
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Figures 2 and 3 about here 
5. Case, method and measurements 
Data were drawn from nine citizen summits held in six European countries in the spring 
of 2014. Citizen summits are a form of public engagement exercise, which have proved 
effective in raising awareness and increasing democratic participation in matters of 
political and social importance (Bedsted et al., 2015). The summit design applied 
combined a participatory ethos with academically rigorous data collection methods. 
Following previous studies (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013), countries were grouped into 
clusters using Hofstede’s (2003) criteria to ensure that DPI was considered across a 
spread of national cultures. Countries were clustered where their scores were similar 
along a majority of Hofstede’s five dimensions: power-distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. The clusters represented 
North Europe (Norway and U.K.), Central (Austria and Switzerland) and Southern 
Europe (Italy and Spain). Two hundred citizens attended each summit and participants 
were recruited against national demographic profiles. It is important to note that the 
results are not generalizable to country level but do represent some interesting points of 
comparison. Details of the sample are given in table one. 
Table 1 about here 
Each summit considered two SOSTs, of which DPI was one. The research design 
ensured that participants were familiar with the use, functions, benefits and limits of 
DPI before making their assessments. Prior to attending the event, participants received 
an information magazine which explained the issues under discussion and the benefits 
and risks associated with DPI and other SOSTsvi. This information was supplemented 
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with a seven-minute documentary film shown during the summitsvii. The films and the 
magazine were produced by the research team. The materials were read and absorbed by 
the majority of the participants. They were asked whether they understood what DPI 
was before the discussions started. With the exception of the U.K., the majority said 
they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “I understand what DPI is” (Austria: 
65%; Italy: 53%; Norway: 74%; Spain: 60%; U.K.: 31%; Switzerland: 75%). The large 
majority of study participants in each country also agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement “I have gained new insight by participating in the citizen summit” (Austria 
72%; Italy 93%; Norway 89%; Spain 77%; U.K. 90%; Switzerland 85%).  
At each summit, participants sat in table groups. There were approximately 25 
discussion groups per summit, each comprising around eight participants, a note-taker 
and a facilitator. The day-long events were divided into segments in which participants 
viewed one of the documentary films, discussed the content in their table groups and 
then answered questions in plenary about their views. During the table discussions the 
facilitators ensured that the participants were able to identify the national security 
agencies to which the discussion related. Plenary questions were answered using an 
audience response system, with participants using a voting handset to record their 
responses on a five-point Likert scale.  
Significant effort was deployed during questionnaire development to ensure that it was 
effective for use in a plenary voting setting. Questions had to be short and simple, with 
clear wording which avoided double negatives. Multi item measures for single 
subscales felt repetitive and so a careful choice of measures had to be made. Reversing 
scales within question batches were avoided, as they caused confusion. Questions had to 
be built in a logical order, so that the head facilitator could enliven them for the 
participants. Immediate feedback was given to the participants so that they could see the 
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spread of responses in the room and feel more engaged in the process. The measures 
used are shown in table two. 
Table 2 about here 
Participants engaged with the risks, benefits and use contexts of DPI. Its benefits were 
that it could improve information security and the fight against crime by identifying and 
blocking harmful or criminal messages. Participants were told that it could prevent 
cybercrime by preventing the spread of computer viruses and assist in the detection of 
crime and provide evidence in an investigation. The risks were that it removed 
communications privacy, had a chilling effect on democratic debate, was relatively 
unregulated, the users of it were difficult to hold to account, and it was not always 
effective at detecting illegal material. Table three gives the descriptive statistics for each 
variable. 
Table 3 about here 
6. Findings 
Evidence was found to support all hypotheses and the presence of three partial 
mediation effects, which are reported in table four. The results confirm that increased 
institutional trustworthiness increases public acceptance of DPI (H1a: p=0.32**)viii. 
Institutional trustworthiness is also a key antecedent of how citizens evaluate security 
benefits and privacy impacts. Establishing institutional trustworthiness in the context of 
DPI also increases public perceptions of SOST effectiveness (H1b: p=0.53**) and 
decreases SOST perceived intrusiveness (H1c: p=-0.27**). DPI effectiveness was 
shown to have a strong direct effect on public acceptance (H2a: p=0.56**); it also 
partially mediates the relationship between trustworthiness and public acceptance (M1: 
p=0.35**). As such, where there are high levels of institutional trustworthiness, the 
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public are likely to interpret DPI as effective. Similarly, where there are high levels of 
institutional trustworthiness, the public is likely to interpret DPI as less intrusive (H1c: 
p=-0.27**). However, high levels of perceived DPI intrusiveness was shown to reduce 
both SOST acceptance (H3a: p=-0.19) and SOST perceived effectiveness (H3b: p=-
0.21**) and to partially mediate the relationship between institutional trustworthiness 
and public acceptance of DPI (M2: p=0.60**). Finally, effectiveness partially mediates 
the effect of intrusiveness on acceptance (M3: p=-0.21**). 
Table 4 about here 
Figure four presents an overview of the results. In brief, the more security agencies are 
perceived to be trustworthy when handling DPI, the more positive the participants were 
about its use (H1a). Those who perceive security agencies to be trustworthy are also 
more likely to consider DPI as an effective security measure (H1b) and support its use 
(H2a). In contrast, those who consider DPI intrusive are more critical and more willing 
to question its effectiveness as a security measure (H3b). Furthermore, the less people 
perceive security operators to be trustworthy, the more likely they are to consider DPI 
as an intrusive measure (H1c) and unwilling to accept its use (H3a). Both intrusiveness 
(M2) and effectiveness (M1) have an influence on the effect that security agents’ 
perceived trustworthiness exercise on people’s willingness to accept DPI. Finally, 
perceiving DPI as an effective measure decreases people’s concerns about its 
intrusiveness, which in turn contributes to increase DPI acceptance (M3). 
Figure 4 about here 
Hypotheses were tested using structural equation modelling—SEM (Bowen & Guo, 
2011), and the Asymptotic Distribution Free estimator (Browne, 1984), which does not 
require data to be normally distributed (Ding, Velicer et al., 1995). The model was 
tested on a total sample of 1,202 usable cases. Sample size satisfied the condition for the 
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correct use of large-sample estimation methods, which requires a ratio of observed 
variables over sample size larger than 1:50. Measurement reliability was assessed by 
computing Louis Guttman’s (1945) split-half reliability coefficient. Cronbach’s (1951) 
Alpha reliability coefficient was used to estimate a scale’s internal consistency (Sheng 
& Sheng, 2012). Results of these tests show good levels of reliability (Lance, Butts et 
al., 2006) for all constructs (trustworthiness: Alpha 0.74; Split-half: 0.73; effectiveness: 
Alpha 0.70; Split-half: 0.71; intrusiveness: Alpha 0.57; Split-half: 0.47), and acceptable 
levels for the dependent variable (acceptance: Alpha 0.56; Split-half 0.51). All other 
model fit indexes show very good results (CFI = .949; GFI = .979; RMSA = .029). 
Computed bias-corrected confidence intervals (95% confidence level; 2,000 bootstrap 
samples) were calculated to assess the presence of mediation effects by adopting 
Andrew Hayes’ (2013) approach and Reuben Baron and David Kenny’s (1986) 
procedure. 
7. Trustworthiness and the public acceptance of DPI: Towards a research 
agenda 
The results demonstrate that the perceived trustworthiness of security agencies shaped 
participants’ evaluations of the effectiveness, intrusiveness and thence their acceptance 
of DPI. This finding is significant for a number of reasons. First, it confirms Dourish 
and Anderson’s (2006), view that the institutional context is critical in shaping 
participants’ perceptions about the acceptability, perceived effectiveness and 
intrusiveness of SOSTs. Second, the identified mediation effects highlight that this 
institutional shaping is powerful and pivotal, in that it impacted the participants’ 
perceptions in both positive and negative ways. Low trustworthiness was associated 
with increased perceptions of intrusiveness and high trustworthiness with increased 
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perceptions of effectiveness. Third, the negative effect exercised by the perceived 
intrusiveness of DPI on its perceived effectiveness appears at first to support the view 
that these two variables are inversely related, reinforcing notions that enhancing both 
security and privacy is difficult to achieve (Monahan, 2006; Tsoukala, 2006). However, 
while security and privacy have been presented in the media and by policymakers as 
incompatible, we argue that this incompatibility is not a foregone conclusion. As there 
is a clear institutional dimension shaping these perceptions, we argue that there may be 
measures and mechanisms which meaningfully and substantively address citizens’ 
concerns about intrusiveness so that security benefits and privacy protections are both 
maximized. A society whose public institutions protect fundamental rights is 
experienced as much more secure than one which does not. 
Indeed, there is public policy value in seeking to protect both privacy and security. It 
has been suggested, for instance, that privacy should be integrated into, rather than 
pitched against, security policy (Solove, 2011); and that excessive surveillance 
undermines, rather than enhances, security (Landau, 2011). These stakes rise if the data 
are subsumed into opaque security practices driven by data analytics, as is the case with 
DPI. Security measures could be assessed in relation to their overall impact on all 
security assets present in a society (Pavone, Santiago Gomez et al., 2016). How then 
may this be achieved in practice? The public experience of security rests as much on the 
deployment of armed forces overseas as it does in neighbourhoods and high streets, 
implicating many layers of governance. Democratic due process is key to fostering 
trustworthiness in national security governance arrangements and states must take 
strong responsibility for governing diverse security stakeholders in a democratically 
robust and transparent way (Loader and Walker, 2007). However, fostering 
trustworthiness is not a simple matter, as it has three dimensions—benevolence, 
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competence and integrity—which need to be considered and, as these results show, are 
relevant to public perceptions (Mayer, Davis et al., 1995).  
Reflecting competence, the first question concerns whether the state should set up 
regulatory arrangements which monitor and disseminate the consequences of resource 
distribution in security. National standards of service could be devised to govern diverse 
security providers. These standards would need to go beyond profit seeking and serve 
the interests of the broader community. Public reporting on security agency 
performance directly relates to public perceptions of their competence in addressing 
threats. Reflecting benevolence, the second question concerns the extent to which the 
state should seek to determine whether different sections of society who are subject to 
different security risks are experiencing appropriate levels of security and receiving 
appropriate protection. Furthermore, the state needs to understand how security 
protections intersect with other forms of social protection for vulnerable groups. To 
what extent can the state devise and maintain mechanisms of conversation and 
contestation so that different points of view may be recognized and constructively 
incorporated into policy? Citizen participation in security agendas hence relates to 
perceptions of benevolence: that the agency is acting in the interests of the whole 
community. Reflecting integrity, rights are a vital ingredient of national security and the 
state must ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for ensuring that human rights 
are incorporated into security enactments. Efforts to improve transparency and to 
encourage exercise of democratic rights in security settings will influence perceptions of 
integrity: whether the agency will ‘do the right thing’ and not abuse its power.  
These suggestions, which are based on Loader and Walker’s (2007) analysis, inform the 
development of a research agenda in this area. They imply that the democratic process 
can be used to embrace differences of opinion in relation to security matters at a number 
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of levels, rather than silence them, as Huysmans (2014) has warned. Attention is 
particularly drawn to whether the deliberative turn, recently emerged in other areas of 
public administration, may be mobilized in relation to security governance in a 
substantial and meaningful way. In Latin America, for example, the potential for the 
democratization of state-society relations has been famously tested through 
‘participatory budgeting’ (Avritzer, 2009), whilst in Europe innovative mechanisms like 
‘Citizens Juries’, ‘Citizens Panels’ and ‘Open Space’ have become more common 
(Fung, 2003). More recently such innovations have been supplemented by mechanisms 
that are realized through new digital technologies, such as electronic voting, 
‘hackathons’, ‘living labs’, ‘maker spaces’ and online discussion forums (Webster & 
Leleux, 2018). Future research may assess whether any of these and other mechanisms 
could be mobilized in the security sphere, and the levels, practices and institutions in 
which they could be so mobilized.  
Furthermore, mobilising the democratic process goes beyond merely inviting citizens to 
engage with such mechanisms. As Arnstein (1969) has famously highlighted, the 
labelling of citizen-state interaction as ‘participatory’ can in fact result in the 
marginalization of certain voices and an overwhelming pressure to comply with and 
consent to whatever the state wishes to accomplish. Research needs to address how 
citizens may see themselves as having a voice and being able to contribute meaningfully 
in security settings. If citizens have been subject to discriminatory state practices in the 
past, they may well find such participation challenging. Research may also examine the 
impact of citizen attempts to empower themselves in the face of security institutions, so 
that they may develop their capacity to question the security to which they are subject. 
Research also needs to determine which outcomes of deliberative processes would be 
most meaningful in terms of enhancing institutional trustworthiness so that citizens can 
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see for themselves how their participation has had an impact. Participatory spaces are 
populated with policy professionals whose expertise will necessarily constitute what 
they can and cannot say in these settings, as well as the arguments that they support or 
oppose. If strongly entrenched political actors are controlling the participation, what are 
the opportunities for change? How may the boundaries of these institutions be made 
more porous? Research may examine the points in the security governance structure 
which are the most amenable to deliberation and engagement, including intersections 
with third party providers and private sector organizations. It may also examine how 
local arrangements can facilitate citizens and consumers being informed, consulted, 
involved in or co-producers of the means and ends of security. The method deployed in 
this paper—citizen summits, where security solutions are deliberated by the general 
public—provides a template for action. 
The paper also makes a number of methodological contributions. First, it confirms that 
the approach to the measurement of trustworthiness adopted in public administration 
and organizational psychology can be applied in national security settings. In this 
approach, institutional trustworthiness is a composite measure incorporating three 
subscales. A closer look at the sub-components of institutional trustworthiness also 
confirms significant relationships with each of the public acceptance measures. This 
finding indicates that no single subcomponent was dominant, and that no one feature of 
the security agencies was outstanding in terms of its influence. Competence, 
benevolence and integrity were all strongly related to overall acceptance (Kendall’s Tau 
nonparametric association test: p=.275**; .341**; .278** respectively). As benevolence 
showed a slightly stronger correlation, the paper recommends that further research 
should examine whether participants sought particular assurance that security agencies 
were working for the benefit of all in society. Second, it advances new multi-scalar 
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measures of public acceptance, improves on the single item measures used in previous 
research. Third, it consolidates the suggestions made by Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris 
(2008) that both effectiveness and intrusiveness are underpinned by a series of 
subcomponents. Accuracy, perceived safety and validity underpin effectiveness and 
consent, discomfort and risk of human rights infringement underpin intrusiveness.  
DPI is a highly intrusive technology, uppermost in the public’s mind at the time the 
fieldwork was undertaken because of the then recent Snowden revelations. It is 
pertinent to question whether these findings can be generalized for all other SOSTs. 
Analysis of data collected about other SOSTs which took place during the fieldwork—
smart CCTV and smartphone location tracking—may confirm these findings. 
Unfortunately, space limitations prevent a description and investigation of each case in 
the current paper. Nevertheless, the methodology presented would enable this study to 
be repeated in other settings. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to examine the institutional trustworthiness of security agencies in 
the current surveillance-intensive climate. It explored public views about internet 
surveillance undertaken by national security agencies by means of Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI). It drew on survey data gathered at nine citizen consultation events 
held in six European countries in 2014. The findings suggested that the perceived 
trustworthiness of security agencies positively influences perceptions of the 
effectiveness of DPI and its overall acceptance. The more trustworthy the security 
agencies were perceived to be, the more likely DPI was considered as an effective and 
appropriate security intervention and the less likely it was perceived as intrusive. The 
findings support calls for security agencies and their respective governments to engage 
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with transparency and the democratic process in order enrich both security and privacy 
at all levels of public security governance and for the common good. If trustworthiness 
is significant for an intrusive surveillance method such as DPI, the likelihood of its 
importance for other intrusive surveillant security methods cannot and should not be 
ignored. These results suggest that an opportunity exists for security agencies to enrich 
both security and privacy by adopting policies and practices which foster 
trustworthiness in practice and in the eyes of the public. 
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i Metadata are data about data. They can include information about when a document was created, and 
what changes have been made on that document. In the case of internet activity, metadata give 
information on IP addresses of senders and recipients of emails, volume of data uploaded or downloaded, 
time and duration of web connection, location data, and so on. 
ii See IXmaps, an internet mapping tool developed by the University of Toronto which provides 
information on internet routing and associated privacy and security issues. IXmaps is available at 
https://www.ixmaps.ca/ 
iii Worldwide there are currently just under 30 providers of DPI to ISPs and governments, including the 
following: Allot Communications Ltd. (Israel); Bivio Networks, Inc. (Canada); Cisco Systems, Inc. 
(U.S.); cPacket Networks, Inc. (U.S.); Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (China); Procera Networks (U.S.); 
Qosmos (France); R&S Cybersecurity ipoque GmbH (Germany); Sandvine Incorporated ULC (Canada); 
SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC (U.S.); SonicWALL L.L.C. (U.S.) and Vedicis (U.S.) (Research&Markets 
2017). 
iv In drawing on these literatures we acknowledge that resistance is a core concept in the sociological 
canon, based on deep, historical descriptions of the social world using a variety of data sources. As a 
phenomenon with a strong basis in praxis, the concept’s dimensions have not been easily quantifiable and 
scales not readily derived. 
v Airport passenger and baggage screening; explosive detector canines; hidden camera surveillance of 
individuals for gait analysis and facial recognition; data mining of individual business and financial 
transactions; passports with RFID tags; monitoring of Internet and email; location tracking through global 
positioning systems in cell phones and cars; travel tracking through Secure Flight and other risk 
assessment systems; trusted traveller programs to speed up security screening; national identity card; 
citizen observers; radiation monitoring at border crossings. 
vi The magazine and an overview of the films can be found at: http://surprise-project.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/SurPRISE-D4.3-Information-material-and-documentary-films.pdf  
vii The films can be viewed at: http://surprise-project.eu/dissemination/information-material-from-the-
participatory-events/ 
viii ** denotes a confidence interval of 99%. 
 




Figure 2. Mediation effect number three 
 
 
Figure 3. Overall theoretical model 
 
  
Figure 4. Overall empirical model 
 
  
 Table 1. Study participants’ characteristics 
Country 









Belonging to a 
minority ethnic 
group 
1. Austria 234  51% 51% 18% 21% 
2. Italy 191  53% 50% 21% 26% 
3. Norway 129  54% 47% 33% 12% 
4. Spain 180  47% 66% 21% 10% 
5. United Kingdom 214 
 
47% 61% 39% 26% 
6. Switzerland 254  58% 41% 30% 38% 
Total 1,202      
 
  
Table 2. Constructs’ dimensions and questionnaire items 
DPI perceived acceptance (DV) 
Construct dimension Questionnaire item 
1. DPI Support 
“Overall I support the adoption of DPI as a national security measure.”  
(5-points Likert scale) 
2. DPI Avoidance 
“Please choose the statement you mostly agree with: 
1. I would not go online because of DPI 
2. I would avoid going online because of DPI 
3. I do not think I would change my behavior online 
4. I would change how I behave online because of DPI 
5. I would definitely not change my behavior online.” 
3. Opposition to DPI 
“Please choose the statement you mostly agree with: 
1. I am prepared to use any means I can to prevent its use 
2. I am prepared to campaign actively against its use 
3. I would support others who were protesting against its use 
4. I would like to find out more how to protect my privacy 
5. I do not oppose it at all.” 
DPI perceived effectiveness (IV) 
Construct dimension Questionnaire item 
4. Accuracy 
“In my opinion, DPI is an effective national security tool.” (5-points Likert 
scale) 
5. Safety 
“When I am online, I feel more secure because DPI is used.” (5-points 
Likert scale) 
6. Validity 
“DPI is an appropriate way to address national security threats.” (5-points 
Likert scale) 
DPI perceived intrusiveness (IV) 
Construct dimension Questionnaire item 
7. Risk of embarrassment “The idea of DPI makes me feel uncomfortable.” (5-points Likert scale) 
8. Perceived intrusiveness 
“I feel DPI is forced upon me without my permission.” (5-points Likert 
scale) 
9. Risk of human rights 
infringement 
“DPI worries me because it could violate my fundamental human rights.” 
(5-points Likert scale) 
Institutional trustworthiness (IV) 
Construct dimension Questionnaire item 
10. Ability 
“Security agencies which use DPI are competent at what they do.” (5-points 
Likert scale) 
11. Benevolence 
“Security agencies which use DPI are concerned about the welfare of 
citizens as well as national security.” (5-points Likert scale) 
12. Integrity 
“Security agencies which use DPI do not abuse their power.” (5-points 
Likert scale) 
  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables in the model 
n = 1,202 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
DPI perceived acceptance     
1. Overall I support the adoption of DPI as a 
national security measure 
2.87 1.47 -0.35 -1.00 
2. Active avoidance of DPI 3.41 1.41 -1.18 0.86 
3. Challenging the use of DPI for security 
purposes 
3.05 1.54 -0.84 -0.59 
DPI perceived effectiveness     
4. In my opinion, DPI is an effective national 
security tool 
2.91 1.42 -0.41 -0.75 
5. When I am online, I feel more secure 
because DPI is used 
2.02 1.18 0.35 -0.52 
6. DPI is an appropriate way to address 
national security threats 
2.84 1.42 -0.38 -0.75 
DPI perceived intrusiveness     
7. I feel DPI is forced upon me without my 
permission 
4.14 1.44 -1.89 2.56 
8. The idea of DPI makes me feel 
uncomfortable 
3.58 1.45 -0.97 0.07 
9. DPI worries me because it could violate my 
fundamental human rights 
3.92 1.46 -1.49 1.25 
Institutional trustworthiness     
10. Security agencies which use DPI are 
competent at what they do 
2.49 1.38 -0.43 -0.75 
11. Security agencies which use DPI are 
concerned about the welfare of citizens as well 
as national security 
2.64 1.39 -0.35 -0.80 
12. Security agencies which use DPI do not 
abuse their power 
2.08 1.26 0.13 -0.73 
 
  
Table 4. Tested mediation effects 
 IV => M => DV 
Direct effect 
without mediator 





M1 TRU => EFF => ACC 0.737 (Sig. .001) 0.351 (Sig. .001) Sig. .004 
Partial mediation 
effect 
M2 TRU => INT => ACC 0.737 (Sig. .001) 0.603 (Sig. .001) Sig. .004 
Partial mediation 
effect 
M3 INT => EFF => ACC -0.492 (Sig. .001) -0.210 (Sig. .001) Sig. .005 
Partial mediation 
effect 
 
  
